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The recent appeal of Lord Justice Kennedy" for unified laws
covering the various fundamental transactions of business and of
domestic relations is not a mere dream, but rests on a solid foun-
dation of fact,-namely the too-often overlooked agreement as to
essentials which exists in modern law throughout the world.
So thoroughly have the principles of Roman law survived or
been re-absorbed in all modern jurisprudence that a movement
for unification of the private laws of the world is a natural result
of this situation. The world of today is witnessing a virtual
economic unity, and also something approaching a political unity
as a result of the growth of arbitration and treaties: is it time to
try to supplement these unities by a unification of private laws?
Perhaps in no department of private law is there a better oppor-
tunity for such unification than in the law of acquisitive prescrip-
tion, which already is of world-wide agreement as to its essential
doctrines.
The origin of the term "prescription" is interesting. It arose
from the way of pleading in a Roman lawsuit the acquisition or
extinction of a right by lapse of time: it was what was alleged-
written first (praescriptio)-in the very beginning 2 of the com-
mission3 to the trial referee and before the statement of the plain-
itff's claim. It thus indicated to the referee4 that he was to try
the preliminary allegation before he proceeded to the main issue.5
I See his Address as President of the International Law Association
at London, 1910.
2 Prae-scriptio,--literally something "written first or before"-Gaius,
4, 132.
3 i. e., the "formula" or "short decree" of the praetor or other magis-
trate containing written instructions to the person or persons appointed to
try the issues of a case.
4i. e., the "judex", "arbiter", "recuperator".
5 If the praescriptio was found to be true, the suit was dismissed or
suspended.
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There were many such praescriptionesO pleadable by either the
plaintiff or the defendant: one of the most important was the
praescriptio setting forth acquisition or extinction, of a right by
lapse of time.7 Subsequently, by metonymy, this term of pleading
served to denote the substantive right itself, which was then like-
wise called "praescriptio",-whence the modern legal term "pre-
scription".
Roman law in its final development recognized two sorts of
prescription,-acquisitive and extinctive.' The difference be-
tween the two is merely the effect of lapse of time upon the right
prescribed. Acquisitive prescription" is the acquisition of a right
by lapse of time; extinctive prescription is the extinction of a
right by lapse of time.10 Extinctive prescription is not a mode of
acquiring ownership, while acquisitive prescription is. Extinctive
prescription is but a mode of extinguishing an obligation or right
in person, and is based on the principle of the limitation of actions.
Acquisitive prescription may be defined as the acquisition of a
thing by possession thereof as if owner for the period of time
fixed by law."' It is acquisition" by operation of law: the courts
then reftise to recognize the title of the old owner. The purpose
of constituting prescription is to put an end to litigation. 12
In modern law prescription is also a recognized mode of ac-
quiring ownership." "Prescription is a manner of acquiring the
6 The best known were the "praescriptio prejudicii" (i. e., the suit ought
not to have been brought at all-Gais, 4, 133), and the "praescriptio fori"
(i. e., the suit is not within the jurisdiction of the Court-Digest, 2, 8, 7).
Both of these exist in modern law, but under other names.
7 This was technically known as "praescriptio temporis",-a praescrip-
tio possible for a defendant to plead.
s The Civil Code of Chile very sharply draws the distinction between
these two kinds of prescription,-see articles 2492, 2498, 2514.
9 "raescriptio acquisitiva",-see Mackeldy, Civil Law, (Kauffman's
Edition) §202 (Kauffman's note) ; Civil Code of Chile, 2492, 2498.
10 "Praescriptio extinctiva",-see Mackeldy, Civil Law, §202 and 276
Kauffman's notes; Civil Code of Chile, 2514.
"Digest 41, 3, 3; Gaits, 2, 41-61; Ulpian, Reg. 19, 8; Inst. of Justinian
2, 6; Code 7, 26-40; Novel 22; Nov. 119, 7; Nov. 131, 6; Cod. Theodos, 4,
13; Paulus, Sent. 5, 2.
12 "Ut aliquis litium finis esset"-- Digest 41, 10, 5. See Broom, Legal
Maximus, p. *695 note 3.
'1 Anglo-American Law, 2 Blackstone. Comm. p. 195-196, 263-266;
Civil Code of France 2219 et seq; Spain 1940 et seq; Germany 937 et seq;
Italy 2105 et seq; Portugal 517 et seq; Austria 1451 et seq; M1"exico 1079 et
seq; Chile 2498 et seq; Argentina 3999 et seq; Louisiana 3472 et seq; Cali-
fornia 1000; Switzerland 661 et seq., 728; Japan 162 et seq.; Quebec 2183 et
seq.
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ownership of property-by the effect of time and under the con-
ditions regulated by law. '14 "Ownership and other real rights
are acquired by prescription in the manner and under the rules
specified by law."'15 Although prescription was unknown to an-
cient Anglo-Saxon law,' 6 yet such rudimentary notions of it as
the English common law developed wre introduced from the
Roman law by Bracton.'
7
There are two kinds of acquisitive prescription,--ordinary s
and extraordinary.' The most obvious distinction between the
two is the period of time required by law for the completion of
each prescription,--ordinary prescription being completed in
three, ten or thirty years, while extraordinary necessitates thirty
or forty years or is immemorial.
Requisites of Every Prescription.-Both kinds of acquisitive
prescription have three common requisites,--the property must be
capable of being prescribed, there must be a continuous uninter-
rupted possession of the property for the period of time fixed by
law, and there must be good faith.
i. Prescriptible Property.-The first requisite to every pre-
scription is that the property must be capable of being prescribed.
Things not susceptible to private ownership 2 are absolutely in-
capable of acquisition by prescription either in Roman2 or mod-
ern law.2' This is the general rule. "A title by prescription cannot
.4 Louisiana Civil Code 3457, which literally translates the French
Civil Code Article 2219. The Italian, Mexican, Chilean Civil Codes are as
to this definition practically the same as the French: see Civil Code of
Italy 2105; Mexico 1059; Chile 2492.
15 Civil Code of Spain (and Philippine Islands) 1930 (Walton's ed.);
Porto Rico 1831.
16 Scrutton, Roman Law, p. 49.
1 Id. p. 91, 92; Giiterbock, Bracton, p. 118.
Is The terms "ordinary" and "extraordinary" are used in a modern
-code,--Chilean Code 2506. "Ordinary" prescription is known in Roman
law as "praescriptio", or "usucapio" (in the ante-Justinian law: usucapio
in the Justinian law refers to prescription of movables only), or "pos-
sessio longi temporis" (in the ante-Justinian law).
19 Known in Roman law as "praescriptio XXX vel XL annis", or4
'praescriptio longissimi temporis", or "praescriptio immemorialis."
20 "Res extra commercium"-withdrawn from commerce.
21 Inst. of lustinian 2, 6, 1; Digest 41, 3, 9.
22 Civil Code of Austria 1455; Spain (Philippine Islands) 1936; Porto
Rico 1837; France 2226, 714; Louisiana 3479, 3497; Quebec 2201; Mexico
1061; Chile 2498; Italy 2113. Things "extra commercium" are tacitly
recognized in Anglo-American and German law: see 2 Blackstone, Comm.
-p. 14, 263; Robinson, El. Law §§38, 132-133; Schuster, Prin. of German
Law, p. 59-60.
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be acquired to property which is not capable of private owner-
ship. '2 3 "Only the things-which are 'in commerce' can be pre-
scribed. -2 4 "All things which are in commerce are susceptible of
prescription. '2 5 "All things which are the object of commerce are
capable of prescription." 2  But there may be things which, al-
though susceptible of ownership, are by law temporarily with-
drawn from the operation of prescription.2 7  Prescription here is
often said to be suspended. 2  The following are made thus ex-
empted from prescription: dotal property during marriage, 29 and
property of wards and minors during their guardianship.30 But
these exemptions are not absolute: ownership of even such ex-
empted property can be acquired by prescriptive possession for
thirty or forty years.3 '
And yet the running of prescription is suspended absolutely in
one case,-stolen things. Stolen things32 and property taken pos-
session of by violence 3  can never be acquired by adverse pos-
session by the thief or wrongful ejector, who are forever barred
from obtaining a prescriptive title no matter how long is their
possession. 4 For their possession was acquired mala fide, and
23 French Civil Code 2226 (Wright).
24Mexican Civil Code 1061 (Taylor).
2: Spanish Civil Code 1936 (Walton).
26 Porto Rican Civil Code 1837.
27 The "res inhabiles" of the Roman Law,--Sohm, Roman Law, (3d
English edition) §64.
2s ROMAN LAW:-Code 5, 12, 30; Code 7, 40, 1, §2; Code 7, 39, §4;
Mackeldy, Civil Law §277. MODERN LAW :-Civil Code of Chile 2509;
France 2252; Louisiana 3521-3527; Germany 202-205; Italy 2119-2120;
Mexico 1119-1126.
29ROM'AN LAW:-Code 5, 12, 30. MODERN LAW :-Civil Code
of Mexico 1116; Louisiana 3524-3525; Italy 2120; France 2255-2256; Ger-
many 204; Chile 2509; Argentina 3970; Switzerland (code of obligations)
153; Japan 159.
30 ROMAN LAW :-Code 7, 35, 3. MODERN LAW :-Civil Code of
Austria 1494; Mexico 1115; Louisiana 3522; France 2252; Italy 2120; Ger-
nany 204; Chile 2509; Argentina 3966; Switzerland (code of obligations)
153; Japan 159.
31 The period of time required for the Roman "extraordinary" pre-
scription. See also Sohm, Roman Law, §64, p. 339-340.
32 Provision of the Roman Law of the XII Tables,--see Inst. of Jus-
tinian 2, 6, 2.
3 Provision of the Lex Julia et Plautia,-see Inst. of Jstinian 2, 6. 2.
34 ROMAN LAW :-Inst. of Justinian 2, 6, 2-4; Digest 41, 3, 4, 6-21;
Sohm, Roman Law p. 339-340. Not even the longest prescription known
to the Roman Law-the "extraordinary"--is available. MODERN LAW:-
Civil Code of Spain 1956; France 2279; Italy 2146; Mexico 1090; Austria
1464; Portugal 553.
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will forever remain so.33 But a restoration of the property to the
possession of the owner purges it of its taint, and makes it again
capable of prescription." A third party obtaining the property
in good faith from the thief or wrongful ejector is not disqualified
from acquiring it by prescription.3 7 And the law of England also
favors a bona fide purchaser of stolen goods,38 who buys them
prior to the thief's conviction.3
2. Continuous Uninterrupted Possession.-Another requisite
of every prescription in both Roman and Modern law is a con-
tinuous uninterrupted possession of the property for the period of
time fixed by law.40  There are twb ways of interrupting a pre-
scription: natural interruption, 41 or actual loss of the possession,
and legal interruption,4 2 or the bringing of a suit against the" pos-
sessor's right. Both ways of interruption are recognized in mod-
ern as well as in Roman law.43
In both Roman and Modern law the person intending to pre-
scribe the property can, to complete the period of prescription,
add together all the times of possession of other persons in privity
with him, such as that of a decedent from whom he inherited or
that of the person selling to him.44 The period of prescription is
35 "Vitium rei inhaerens",-Mackeldy, Civil Law, §277.
30 Digest 41, 3, 4, 6; Digest 50. 16, 215; Inst. of Justinian 2, 6, 8.
37 See Sohm, Roman Law, §64, p. 340.
38 Purchased in "market overt".
39 See 24 and 25 Vict. ch. 96 §100; Williams. Inst. of Justinian, p. 103.
After the thief is convicted, the bona fide purchaser may have to return
the property to its owner.
40 ROMAN LAW :-Digest 41, 3, 25. MODERN LAW :-Civil Code
of Louisiana 3487, 3500, 3506; France 2229; Germany 937; Italy 2106; Por-
tugal 517; Chile 2507; Argentina 3948; Mexico 1079; Austria 1460; Quebec
2193; Japan 162; Switzerland 661; Anglo-American Law-Robinson, El.
Law, §§132-133.
41 "Usurpatio naturalis",--Mackeldy, Civil Law, §277.
42 "Usurpatio civilis",-Mackeldy, Civil Law, §277.
43 ROMAN LAW:-Digest 41, 3, 2, and 5; Code 7, 32, 10; Code 7, 40,
2 and 3; Code 7, 33, 1; Digest 44, 3, 10. MODERN LAW :-Civil Code of
Louisiana 3516-3518; France 2242-2246; Italy 2123-2125; Chile 2501-2503;
Germany 940-941; Spain 1944-1945; Mexico 1117; Anglo-American Law,-
Robinson, El. Law, §§132-133.
44 ROMAN LAW :-Inst. of Justinian 2, 6, 12-14; Digest 44, 3. MOD-
ERN LAW :-Civil Code of Louisiana 3493-3496; France 2235; Spain 1960;
Porto Rico 1861; Austria 1493; Mexico 1077; Germany 943-944; Chile
2500; Anglo-American Laze.-Robinson, El. Law, §§132-133.
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held to be completed at the end of its last day in Roman, French,
Spanish, German, Italian, Mexican and Japanese law."
3. Good Faith.-The last requisite of every prescription in
both Roman and Modern law is good faith4" on the part of the
possessor.4 7 To possess by force, or secretly, or upon sufferance
is not possession in good faith.4" In other words the possession
must be peaceable, and open or public.49 So too in English law
user which is by sufferance or secret will not establish a prescrip-
tive law. 0
Moreover the Roman law required that the party who pre-
scribes must begin in good faith his possession. 1 But here
English law apparently differs from the Roman: the possession
need not originate bona fide.52 And yet this difference is not after
all so real: cases in Roman law where the usual kinds of prescrip-
tion are not available admit of the rare immemorial prescrip-
tion, 3 and a possession begun mala fide can serve as a basis for a
perpetual usage or exercise of a right.
4r "Totem postrenum diem",-Digest 41, 3, 6. Civil Code of France
2261; Germany 188; Italy 2134; Spain 1960; Mexico 1129; Japan 141.
46 "Bona fides". The "Conscience", on which equity in our law acts,
very closely resembles the Roman "bona fides",-see Spence, Equity 411.
47 ROMAN LAW :-Inst. of Justinian 2, 6, pr. Mackeldy, Civil Law,
§277, §281,.note E: Sohm, Roman Law, §64, p. 340. MODERN LAW:-
Civil Code of Louisiana 3479, 3506; France 2265; Italy -2136; Spain 1955,
1957; Porto Rico 1856, 1858; Anglo-American Law-Robinson, El. Law
§§132-133 (it must be "peaceable", "notorious").
48 "Nec vi, nec clam, nec precario . . . possides",--Digest 43, 17, 1, 5
(Ulpian). This was originally a provision of the Praetor's edict. -
41 See Markby, Elements of Law, §583: our "Peaceable" and "open"
are regarded as equivalent to the Roman "nec vi", "nec clam".
"oSmith v. Miller, 11 Gray (Mass.) 145; Perrin v. Garfield, 37 Vt.
304; Carger v. Fee, 140 Ind. 572; Wiseman v. Lucksinger, 84 N. Y. 31;
Cronkhite v. Saine, 94 N. Y. 323; Johnson v. Skillnan, 29 Minn. 95; Col-
chester v. Roberts, 4 Mees. & W. 769; Cook v. Gammon, 93 Georgia 118;
Daniel v. North, 11 East 372.
51 Digest 41, 4, 2; Digest 41, 3, 15, 2. See also Digest 41, 4, 7, 4-
"mala fides superveniens non nocet": but the Canon law required him to
have been in good faith the entire period of prescription,-"unde orportet,
ut qui praescribit, in nulla temporis parte rei habeat conscientiam alienae,"
cap. 5, X, 2, 26; Mackeldy, Civil Law, §277, 2 note D (end), §281 note E.
52Williams, Inst. of Justinian, p. 100; Markby, Elements of Law,
§582. Markby severely criticises an English decision holding that the
commencement of possession must be "bona fide", i. e. peaceable and open.
53 See Mackeldy, Civil Law, §283.
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Special Requisites of Ordinary Prescription.-In addition to
the general requisites of prescriptible property, its continuous un-
interrupted possession, and the exercise of good faith ordinary
prescription "14 has some special requisites. These are good title
and time.
I. Good Title.-No ordinary prescription can follow unless
there was at its inception a just or sufficient cause5'--such as a
sale, gift, exchange and the like-of transferring the property to
the possessor.56 In other words the prescriber must have ac-
quired possession in a lawful manner,17 and must hold the prop-
tery as his own.
Modern law is the same as the Roman. There must be a "just
title" ;s "a title sufficient to transfer ownership" ;9 "a title legal
and sufficient to transfer property" ;00 "a title . . . received from
any person . . .honestly believed to be the real owner, provided
the title were such as to transfer ownership" ;"1 "an instrument
which is on the face of it capable of giving a title" ;02 "that which
is fundamentally believed to be sufficient to transfer ownership" ;63
"a title which would have sufficed for the acquisition of the
property"; ' 4 "possession as if owner" ;03 "a belief of owner-
ship" ';G "a claim to be the owner".", In one detail English law
seems different from the Roman: although by English law as well
as by Roman the enjoyment of possession must be "of right", yet
in English law it need not originate "of right".08 But this con-
54 Known in Roman law as "praescriptio", or "usucapio" (as to
movables only in the Justinian law, but not in the ante-Justinian law), or
"possessio longi temporis" (in the ante-Justinian law).
"Justus titulus".
56Digest 41, 3, 27; Code 3, 32, 24; Code 7, 14, 6.
- i. e. possess "bona fide pro suo."
r8 Civil Code of Spain 1940 (Walton) : Louisiana 3483; Mexico 1079.
' Spanish Civil Code 1952 (Walton).
10 Louisiana Civil Code 3479.
"1 Louisiana Civil Code 3484, 3483.
02French Civil Code 2265.
03 Mexican Civil Code 1080.
0 Austrian Civil Code 1461.
0-, Civil Code of Germany 900, 937 (Wang) ; Japan 162 (L6nholm).
00Spanish Civil Code (Walton).
60 Anglo-Amercan Law-Robinson, El. law, §133.
68 Williams. Inst. of ustinian, p. 100; Markby, Elements of Law, §582.
'Markby criticises severely an English decision holding that the commence-
ment of prescription must be "of right"; he instances that a prescription
may commence in trespass.
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stitutes no substantial difference: even in Roman law, although
an inception "not of right" would not lead to ordinary prescrip-
tion, it should not be overlooked that it would serve as a basis
for the extraordinary prescription of thirty years."
2. Time.-The other special requisite of ordinary prescription is
the period of time fixed by law.70 In Roman law this term wvas
the expiration of three years for movables-' and of ten or twenty
years for immovable property. 2 Incorporeal things seem to have
been considered as immovables.73
These Roman periods of three years for movables and ten or
twenty years for immovables have survived in the majority of
the modern legal systems, although a few countries do not retain
all three periods. The prescriptive periods in France, Spain, Aus-
tria, Italy, Louisiana, Quebec, Mkexico, Japan are the same as the
Roman periods of time.74 By statute in England twenty years
is the period of prescription for certain incorporeal hereditaments,
as for instance an easement of light.7 5 And this is also a common
period in the United States.
76
According to Roman law if the parties were "present", 77 that
is, both lived in the same province, the prescriptive period was ten
years; if the parties were "absent", 5 that is, lived in different
provinces, the prescriptive period was twenty years.70  And this
69 See infra, Note 83 of this article.
70 "Tempus".
- Inst. of Justinian 2, 6, pr. This is the prescriptive period of time
of the law of Justinian, and it was still referred to under the old name of
usucapio.
72Inst. of Justinian 2, 6, pr. This is the prescriptive period of the law
of Justinian.
73 Hunter, Roman Law, (4th edition) p. 419.
74 Civil Code of France 2279, 2265 (three, ten and twenty) ; Spain
1955, 1957 (three, ten and twenty) ; Porto Rico 1856, 1858 (three, ten and
twenty); Italy 2140, 2135, 2137 (three, ten and twenty); Japan 162, 163
(ten and twenty) ; Quebec 2258, 2268 (three and ten); Austria 1466;
Louisiana 3538, 3544 (three and ten) ; Mexico 1086, 1088 (three, ten and
twenty).
75 See 2 and 3 William IV, ch. 71; Williams, Inst. of Justinian p. 99.
76 Sibley v. Ellis, 11 Gray (Mass.) 417; Curger v. Fee, 140 Ind. 572.
77 "Presentes."
78 "Absentes".
70 Code 7, 33, 12; Code 7, 31, 1; Novel 119, 7; Mackeldy, Civil Law,
§137, 2; Hunter, Roman Law, p. 290.
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Roman extension of ten years more to absent persons has also
descended into many modern legal systems.8
Special Requisite of Extraordinary Prescription,-Time.-The
general requisites of every prescription-namely prescriptible
property, its continuous uninterrupted possession, and good faith
-are supplemented in extraordinary prescription s ' by only one
special requisite,-the term of the prescription is thirty years (or-
dinarily) or forty years (occasionally) .2 At the expiration of
this term the property is acquired by prescription. Defective titles
are cured, and things exempted from ordinary prescription are
acquired by this lengthy extraordinary prescription. 3
The Roman period of thirty years still survives in the law of
numerous modern countries: for instance France, Germany, Italy,
Spain, Austria, Chile, Quebec, Louisiana.8 4  In the law of
England, by statute the period of thirty years suffices8 5 for ac-
quiring certain profits A prendre,--a form of incorporal heredita-
ments. The occasional Roman term of forty years is also a pre-
scriptive period in Austrian law.80 By statute in England forty
years is the prescriptive period for acquiring certain easements.87
Immemorial Prescription.-The Roman law mentions another
peculiar and very rare variety of extraordinary prescription,-
SOFor the purpose of prescription, "domicil in the same state", or
"domicil in a foreign state", is almost always the equivalent of the Roman
domicil in the same or different provinces. See the Civil Code of Spain
1957, 1958; Porto Rico 1858, 1859; Chile 2508. But in France (Civil Code
2266) there is a distinction, like the Roman in principle, between persons
domiciled in or out of the "district" (ressort) ; and in Austria (Code 1474)
there is retained the Roman distinction between absence or presence from
or in a "province".
81 Known in Roman law as the "praescriptio XXX vel XL annis", or
"praescriptio longissimi temporis", in the law of Justinian.
s Code 7, 39, 8, 1 (Justinian): Code 7, 31 (Justinian) : Mackeldy,
Civil Law, §281.
83 Mackeldy, Civil Law, §281; Sohm, Roman Law, p. 340. See supra,
Note 69, of this article.
84 Civil Code of France 2262; Louisiana 3548; Spain 1959; Porto Rico
1860; Chile 2510; Italy 2135; Germany 195; Quebec 2265; Austria 1470,
1480, 1478, 1468, 1477.
8- 2 and 3 William IV ch. 71; Williams Inst. of Justinian, p. 99.
80 Civil Code of Austria 1474, 1477.
872 and 3 William IV ch. 71; Williams, Inst. of Justinian, p. 99.
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immemorial prescription.8" Its basis is this principle: that if any-
one uninterruptedly possessed a thing or right beyond the memory
of man, he should be regarded as its lawful owner or holder.
Hence it is a kind of subsidiary prescription where ordinary or
extraordinary prescription would not be available; and is proved
by witnesses who may qualify either by what they have seen
themselves or heard from their ancestors: The prescriber has to
prove a perpetual usage or exercise of a right.
Immemorial prescription was borrowed from the Roman by
the Canon law,89 and in this way its principles have made an im-
pression on English law. Here is an interesting English blend of
the Roman twenty year and immemorial prescriptions: in the
English common law hereditaments are acquired by usage from
time immemorial; but, according to Stephen" and other authori-
ties,9 enjoyment for twenty years raises a presumption that it is
immemorial.
New Haven, Conn. Charles P. Sherman.
s8"Praescriptio immemorialis" or "indefinita". Digest 43, 203, 4
(Pomponius),-"Ductus aquae cujus origo memoriam excessit, jure con-
stituti loco habetur". See also Digest 8, 5, 10; Digest 39, 3, 2, 1-8; Digest
39, 3, 26. Other expressions are "nec memoriam extare", "quorum
memoriam vetustas excedat", "contrarii memoria non extat". See on this
subject Savigny, Systne, vol. 4, p. 481; Mackeldy, Civil Law, §283.
89 "Vel ex antiquo consuetudine a tempore, cujus non extat memoria,
introducta",-cap. 26, X, 5, 40.
90 1 Stephen, Comm., Book II, pt. 1, ch. 33; Williams, Inst. of Jus-
tinian, 99.
91 Hopkins, Real Property, p. 352, Notes 23 and 24.
